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Abstract
Once firms are being prosecuted for collusion, strategies remain available
to them that have the potential to reduce the penalties they face. Settlement
negotiations oﬀer opportunities to negotiate restricted pleas that limit penal-
ties from follow-on litigation, and leniency programs such as Amnesty Plus
oﬀer opportunities to reduce fines associated with collusion in one product by
revealing collusion in another. We oﬀer implications for antitrust policy.
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1 Introduction
As stated by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), “When competitors collude,
prices are inflated and the customer is cheated. Price fixing, bid rigging, and other
forms of collusion are illegal and are subject to criminal prosecution by the Antitrust
Division of the United States Department of Justice.”1 Furthermore, according to the
DOJ, “In recent years, the Antitrust Division has successfully prosecuted regional,
national, and international conspiracies aﬀecting construction, agricultural products,
manufacturing, service industries, consumer products, and many other sectors of our
economy.”2
In many cases, the prosecution of a cartel is facilitated by the information provided
by a leniency applicant. According to the DOJ website: “The Antitrust Division’s
Leniency Program is its most important investigative tool for detecting cartel activity.
Corporations and individuals who report their cartel activity and cooperate in the
Division’s investigation of the cartel reported can avoid criminal conviction, fines, and
prison sentences if they meet the requirements of the program.”3 In a 2001 speech,
while he was Director of Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Division at the DOJ,
Scott D. Hammond asserted that: “Since we expanded our Amnesty Program in 1993,
there has been more than a ten-fold increase in amnesty applications. In the last two
years, cooperation from amnesty applicants has resulted in scores of convictions and
1“Preventing and Detecting Bid Rigging, Price Fixing, and Market Allocation in Post-Disaster
Rebuilding Projects: An Antitrust Primer for Agents and Procurement Oﬃcials,” p.1, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/disaster_primer.pdf (accessed July 31, 2013).
2“Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and Market Allocation Schemes: What They
Are and What To Look For: An Antitrust Primer,” p.1, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/211578.pdf (accessed July 31, 2013).
3United States DoJ website, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/leniency.html (accessed
October 22, 2012). In Australia, Chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commis-
sion (ACCC), Graeme Samuel stated that the ACCC’s Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct was
“absolutely vital” in the Australian government’s eﬀorts to crack cartels, and he credited it with
exposing potential cases at the rate of about one a month. (Beaton-Wells and Fisse, 2011, p.379)
See also Beaton-Wells (2008a, 2008b) and Wils (2007).
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well over $1 billion in fines.”4
Once a firm is being prosecuted for participation in a cartel, a number of things
can aﬀect the penalties ultimately imposed on the firm. In many jurisdictions, firms
being prosecuted for collusion may negotiate a settlement with the government.5
There appears to be some flexibility for cartels to negotiate settlement terms that
favor them in terms of limiting future penalties, for example from civil litigation, in
exchange for concessions to the competition authority, which may include the amount
of criminal fines, the number of individuals receiving prison terms, or the total length
of prison terms.6 In addition, programs such as the DOJ’s Amnesty Plus program,7
which was implemented in 1999 in response to concerns about oﬀending firms being
involved in price fixing conspiracies in multiple product markets, allow a firm being
prosecuted for collusion to qualify for reduced fines by applying for leniency in a
separate product in which it is also engaged in collusion.
In this paper, we consider firms’ strategies related to settlement negotiation and
leniency applications once they are being prosecuted for collusion. Our focus is on
the implications for antitrust policy.
In Section 2, we discuss the eﬀects of settlement negotiations on deterrence through
their impact on follow-on litigation. In Section 3, we present a simple model of settle-
ment negotiation. In Section 4, we discuss how leniency programs can aﬀect incentives
for multi-product colluders, potentially decreasing deterrence and creating incentives
4“When Calculating the Costs and Benefits of Applying for Corporate Amnesty, How Do You
Put a Price Tag on an Individual’s Freedom?,” presented at the ABA’s Criminal Justice Sec-
tion’s Fifteenth Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime, March 8, 2001, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/7647.pdf (accessed October 30, 2012).
5See Beaton-Wells (2008b) and Wils (2008b).
6Policies vary in terms of the flexibility for settlement terms. For example, the Australian Director
of Public Prosecutions’ (DPP) Prosecution Policy states that the charges should bear a reasonable
relationship to the nature of the criminal conduct of the accused.
7See Marshall, Marx, and Mezzetti (2013) and Lefouili and Roux (2012) for discussion and
theoretical models of Amnesty Plus. See also Wils (2008, Chapter 5.4.4).
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for the formation of sacrificial cartels. Section 5 concludes.
2 Settlement terms aﬀect follow-on litigation
Many corporate crimes damage individuals or other purchasers. For example, fraud
and price fixing hurt purchasers while insider trading damages shareholders. When
purchasers are damaged, criminal penalties are just one part of deterrence. In addition
to criminal penalties, there is often civil litigation by either a class, opt-out plaintiﬀs,
or both. The civil litigation can be a substantial part of the financial penalty, and
thus a substantial part of deterrence. In the United States, the absence of a crimi-
nal finding can complicate plaintiﬀs’ eﬀorts in civil litigation and potentially reduce
plaintiﬀs’ expected recoveries. Even when there is a criminal finding, civil litigation
can be significantly aﬀected by the scope of the criminal finding in dimensions such
as the time period, products, geography, suppliers’ behavior, and aﬀected purchasers.
Generally, more limited criminal findings can reduce a supplier’s potential exposure
in civil litigation.
The parameters of the plea agreement also matter to enforcement authorities, but
it appears that some parameters are given more attention than others. A review of
recent DOJ press releases in cartel cases reveals an emphasis, in terms of what is
reported, on the amounts of fines and the extent to which individuals received prison
sentences.8 These press releases do not appear to emphasize the comprehensiveness
of the plea parameters, including the extent to which they encompass all relevant
8DOJ press releases are available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/
(accessed July 31, 2013). This emphasis is echoed in the press, with statements such
as: “With this win under its belt, including the huge fines and the jail times sought
and imposed, expect the DOJ going forward to seek bigger and bigger criminal fines
and longer and longer sentences as a deterrent to future global price fixing conspir-
acies.” (http://www.antitrustlawyerblog.com/2012/09/doj_nets_huge_fines_and_jail_t_1.html,
accessed July 31, 2013)
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time periods, products, buyers, and geographies. This is natural since the public has
no information about a given cartel matter and will be unable to determine if, say, a
plea length is small or large given the evidence, but the public will be able to observe
that a criminal fine of hundreds of millions of dollars seems to be quite punitive and
indicative that antitrust enforcement authorities are ‘doing a good job.’
The true parameters describing the conduct may be hard to infer from the doc-
umentary evidence. For example, whether a price fixing conspiracy had a duration
of eight or ten years may be diﬃcult for enforcement authorities to establish from
the discovery record. Or the enforcement authorities may perceive diﬀerences in the
cost and likely success associated with pursuing more expansive claims regarding the
extent of the conduct, including factors such as the length of the conduct, the set of
products, geographic scope, and purchasers aﬀected.
In such an environment, there are tradeoﬀs to be considered in settlement negoti-
ations. An enforcement authority might view the marginal gains from documenting
all the fine details of a conspiracy as small relative to the expected resources required
to accomplish that. For example, when considering such tradeoﬀs, an enforcement
authority might look favorably upon pleadings that involve relatively shorter plea
periods but relatively higher criminal penalties.
This is consistent with the Canadian experience:
Canada added that in its experience in negotiations of plea agreements
and fines the competition authority might be willing to narrow the scope of
the guilty plea in light of possible subsequent civil action, and might seek
a relatively higher fine to compensate for the reduce[d] charge to ensure
that the fine was adequate in light of the volume of aﬀected commerce. In
the consent agreement the level of the fine might appear distorted because
4
the trade oﬀ struck between lesser charge and higher fine might not be
apparent to the outside observer.9
At the risk of redundancy, but to be clear, we are aware of no evidence that
antitrust enforcement authorities restrict pleas when they have ‘bulletproof’ evidence
in exchange for larger criminal fines. For example, if the DOJ has hard evidence
that a cartel was in place from at least January 2005 through at least December
2008, then we are unaware of any evidence to suggest that the DOJ would ‘sell’ a
reduced plea period, say, January 2006 through December 2007, for a larger criminal
fine. But, it may be the case that the DOJ has good but softer evidence that the
conspiracy started by at least January 2004, and yet softer evidence that it began
as early as January 2000. Similarly there may be good but softer evidence that the
cartel continued until at least June 2009, and even softer evidence that it lasted
until December 2011. Furthermore, the DOJ may have hard evidence that the cartel
aﬀected ten related products, while the evidence is good but weaker that the cartel
aﬀected an additional five products beyond the ten. The DOJ could pour scarce
enforcement funds into shoring up the most expansive time period and entire set of
products in preparation for a trial, but given the limited resources of the DOJ, the
costs and risk of trial, and numerous other cartel cases that need the attention of
the DOJ’s scarce enforcement resources, the DOJ will naturally be drawn towards
accepting a conspiracy plea for “from at least January 2005 through at least December
2008” and aﬀecting “at least 10 products” in exchange for a criminal fine that is
large and perhaps more commensurate with the longer periods and extended set of
products. Counsel for cartel firms negotiate such pleas, gladly paying larger fines for
9Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Working Party No. 3 on Co-
operation and Enforcement, October 13, 2006, “Private Remedies: Class Action / Collective Action;
Interface Between Private and Public Enforcement,” Summary Record of the meeting held on June
7, 2006, at para. 45, DAF/COMP/WP3/M(2006)2/ANN3.
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the restricted pleas, because such pleas reduce expected civil damages, and reduce the
overall penalties — criminal plus expected civil penalties — faced by the cartel firms.
In what follows, we review two cases that raise questions as to whether the criminal
pleading understated the full extent of the conspiracy. In the next section, we discuss
the results of a simple model that illustrates the incentives at play.
2.1 Two examples
2.1.1 Vitamins Cartel
The primary manufacturers of vitamins admitted to participating in an international
price fixing conspiracy for much of the 1990s.10 However, for the individual vitamin
products aﬀected by the conspiracy, there are diﬀerences in the beginning and ending
dates of the conspiratorial activity as identified in U.S. plea agreements versus the
European Commission (EC) decision in Vitamins. For a summary of U.S. plea agree-
ments, see the Expert Report of B. Douglas Bernheim (Bernheim Report, Table 6) in
the Vitamins Antitrust Litigation.11 For example, U.S. plea agreements in vitamin A
for cartel members Roche and BASF identify a plea period from January 1990 until
February 1999, but the EC decision finding begins in September 1989, four months
earlier. Similarly, U.S. plea agreements in vitamin B5 for cartel members Roche and
BASF identify a plea period from January 1991 until December 1998, but the EC
10See, e.g., the European Commission Decision in Vitamins, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:006:0001:0089:EN:PDF (accessed July 31,
2013), and the DOJ press release “Two German Firms and Two U.S. Corporations
Agree to Plead Guilty to Participating in International Vitamin Cartels,” available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2000/4684.htm (accessed July 31, 2013).
11The Expert Report of B. Douglas Bernheim, MDL No. 1285, In Re: Vitamins Antitrust Lit-
igation, Misc. No. 99—0197 (TFH), May 24, 2002, was submitted as exhibit number 243 in In re:
Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, case No. 99—0197 (TFH) filed in the District Court of the District of
Columbia. We obtained the document through a request to the law clerk to Chief Judge Thomas F.
Hogan. The document was made available based on DC Local Civil Rule 79.2 and the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia’s policy of not retaining exhibits that are admitted into
evidence at trial in civil cases.
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decision finding does not end until February 1999, two months later.
In addition, although there were no guilty pleas dating as far back as 1985, eco-
nomic evidence related to coordinated price announcements suggests that the con-
spiracy may have begun in 1985 (Marshall, Marx, and Raiﬀ, 2008).
We can illustrate the eﬀect on overcharge estimates of this diﬀerence in the col-
lusive period based on analysis provided in the Bernheim Report, which estimates
overcharges to the associated plaintiﬀs to be approximately 33% greater when one
views the conspiracy as starting in 1985 rather than only during the period to which
the defendants pled guilty (Bernheim Report, Table 1).
Figure 1 shows the estimated but-for price for a particular vitamin product, Vi-
tamin A Acetate 650 Feed Grade. As you can see from the figure, the but-for price
line (i.e., the price series that would have been observed in the absence of collusion)
is estimated under the assumption that the period prior to 1990 is non-collusive.
Figure 1: Vitamin A Acetate 650 Feed Grade price and but-for price (Source: Bern-
heim Report, Figure 12-6)
We can contrast this to the but-for price line that would result if one assumes that
the conspiracy began instead in 1985. As shown in Figure 2, substantial incremental
overcharges result from this change.
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Figure 2: Vitamin A Acetate 650 Feed Grade price and but-for price (Source: Bern-
heim Report, Figure 14-5)
If, in fact, the conspiracy began in 1985, then the restricted plea in the criminal
case may have substantially reduced civil penalties if civil litigants based overcharge
estimates only on the restricted plea period. The approach taken by the enforcement
authorities may have been reasonable given resource constraints and the tradeoﬀs
they faced, including the consideration of whether the burden of establishing the
existence of the conspiracy in the earlier time period was substantial; however, it is
important to note that limiting pleas in this way can lead to a substantial reduction
in deterrence.
2.1.2 DRAM Cartel
In the dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) conspiracy, firms pled guilty to a
conspiracy that aﬀected only “certain original equipment manufacturers (OEM) of
personal computers and servers.”12 According to the plea agreements, “The conspir-
acy directly aﬀected these OEMs in the United States: Dell Inc., Hewlett-Packard
12See, e.g., the Plea Agreement of Samsung Electronic Company, Ltd. and Samsung Semicon-
ductor, Inc., U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, Case No.
CR05-0643PJH, p.2 (Samsung Plea Agreement).
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Company, Compaq Computer Corporation, International Business Machines Corpo-
ration, Apple Computer Inc., and Gateway, Inc.” (Samsung Plea Agreement, p.4)
(The same sentence appears in the Hynix Plea Agreement13 and in the Infineon Plea
Agreement.14) In addition, the Elpida Plea Agreement identifies Sun Microsystems
as having been aﬀected by the conspiracy.15
These plea agreements are striking in light of evidence that DRAM is largely
a commodity product. For example, testimony before the U.S. International Trade
Commission stated that, “DRAMs are a global commodity product and, in fact, all of
the major DRAM customers insist that their DRAM suppliers oﬀer a single worldwide
price.”16 Given the commodity nature of the product and the “single worldwide price,”
it seems unlikely that the conspiracy’s eﬀects could have been limited to only seven
OEMs in the United States; indeed, it is likely that the conspiracy aﬀected prices
more generally.
This restriction on the plea creates an incremental burden on purchasers of DRAM
other than the seven named OEMs in order for them to recover damages, to the benefit
of the colluding firms.
13Plea Agreement of Hynix Semiconductor Inc., U.S. District Court, Northern District of Califor-
nia, San Francisco Division, Case No. CR 05-249 PJH, p.4 (Hynix Plea Agreement).
14Plea Agreement of Infineon Technologies AG, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Califor-
nia, San Francisco Division, Case No. 04-299 (PJH), pp.3—4 (Infineon Plea Agreement).
15Plea Agreement of Elpida Memory, Inc., U.S. District Court, Northern District of California,
San Francisco Division, Case No. CR 06-0059 (PJH), pp.2—3, 4—5 (Elpida Plea Agreement). The
Elpida Plea Agreement states: “For purposes of forming and carrying out the conspiracy charged in
Count Two of the Information, Defendant’s employees had discussions and reached agreements with
employees of its coconspirator on how it would allocate and divide a bid oﬀered by Sun Microsystems
in an auction on or about March 26, 2002. The Defendant and its coconspirators submitted bid
proposals to Sun Microsystems for a bid on a 1 GB NG DIMM lot to achieve that result, including
submitting complementary bids to ensure the success of their agreement.” (Elpida Plea Agreement,
pp.4—5) However, the Infineon, Hynix, and Samsung Plea Agreements make no mention of the
conspiracy having an eﬀect on Sun Microsystems.
16U.S. International Trade Commission Hearing in the Matter of DRAMs and DRAM Modules
from Korea, Investigation No.: 701-TA-431, p.32.
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3 Model
In this section, we provide a model of settlement negotiation between an enforcement
authority and a firm that has engaged in collusion. We assume that the enforcement
authority behaves so as to maximize criminal fines net of enforcement costs (as op-
posed to minimizing anti-competitive behavior). We assume that the firm behaves
so as to minimize the sum of criminal and civil penalties.17 We allow the possibility
that a firm could agree not to contest a criminal fine in exchange for adjustments by
the enforcement authority of the parameters on which the fine is based.
For simplicity, we focus on plea length as the key parameter of the plea agreement.
3.1 Setup
We model the criminal fine as being calculated as follows. We assume that  is the
earliest date and that  is the latest date for the conspiracy that can be argued
given the evidence. The enforcement authority must choose a defensible plea period,
defined by a starting date 0 ∈ [ ] and an ending date 1 ∈ [ ] with 0  1.
Given the plea period, the volume of aﬀected commerce is P1=0  where  is the
volume of aﬀected commerce in period . The enforcement authority must assign a
culpability score  ∈  to the firm,18 where  is the set of culpability scores that can
be argued credibly given the evidence. Finally, the enforcement authority must select
a fine from within the allowable range, given the volume of aﬀected commerce and
the culpability score. We let  ∈ [0 1] denote the scale factor determining the fine’s
distance between the minimum and maximum fine. For example, if the enforcement
17The threat of prison terms for individuals engaged in collusion also has a deterrence eﬀect. A
full analysis of this would require a model of agency issues within firms, the eﬀects of individual
versus corporate leniency, and the deterrent eﬀects of the threat of prison for white collar criminals,
which is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, we focus on financial penalties.
18See U.S.S.G. Section 8C2.5(g)(3).
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authority selects a scale factor of  and if the minimum fine given the plea period and
culpability score is  and the maximum is  then the amount of the fine is +(−).
We let the function (0 1  ) denote the fine; it is a strictly decreasing function of
the starting period 0 and a strictly increasing function of the ending period 1, the
culpability score , and the scale factor .
We let ( ) denote the cost of enforcing the fine combined with any expected
reductions in the fine. We assume that it is a strictly increasing function of both 
and  taking into account the increased workload associated with a more aggressive
fine. In general, one would expect  to increase as  approaches the upper bound
for the culpability score that can be argued given the evidence and to increase as 
approaches one, indicating that the fine approaches the maximum amount given the
volume of aﬀected commerce and the culpability score. The cost may also depend
on 0 and 1 for example if the burden of proving existence of a conspiracy increases
with the time period; however, we focus on the case in which  is independent of the
plea period. While our model incorporates the eﬀect on cost of the culpability score,
capturing the increased complexity associated with further incorporating the eﬀects
of the plea period on costs to the enforcement authority is beyond the scope of this
paper.
To summarize, an enforcement authority interested in maximizing the amount of
the fine it collects net of enforcement costs chooses the plea period, culpability score,
and scale factor to solve
max
0∈[]1∈[]01∈∈[01]
(0 1  )− ( ) (1)
Let 0  1     be the solution of (1),  = (0  1    ) be the fine,  =
(  ) the enforcement cost, and  − the value of the diﬀerence between the
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fine and the enforcement cost at the solution.
The firm’s objective function is to minimize the sum of criminal and civil penalties.
For simplicity, we assume that civil penalties depend only on damages during the plea
period, and not on the culpability score, scale factor, or the amount of the criminal
fine. Specifically, let (0 1) be damages defined based on a plea period from 0 to
1 where (0 1) is less than or equal to the amount of aﬀected commerce during
the plea period. Civil penalties can be up to triple the damages amount. To avoid
introducing additional parameters, we write the penalties as equal to triple damages,
however, a scale factor can also be introduced to account for less-than-triple damages
with no eﬀect on the qualitative results:
(0 1) = 3(0 1)
Thus, the firm’s payoﬀ related to the enforcement action is
−(0 1  )− (0 1)
We assume that  and hence  are strictly decreasing in 0 and strictly increasing in
1. Letting  = (0  1 ), the firm’s payoﬀ in the absence of negotiation with the
enforcement authority is − −  
3.2 Results
It is immediate from (1) and the fact that  decreases with 0 and increases with 1
that, absent any negotiation with the firm, it is optimal for the enforcement authority
to set 0 =  and 1 =  (recall that we assume the cost to the enforcement authority
is not aﬀected by the length of the plea period).
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Claim 1 In the absence of negotiations with the firm, the enforcement authority max-
imizes the criminal fine by basing it on the maximum justifiable plea period, 0 = 
and 1 = 
Now consider the possibility of negotiations between the enforcement authority
and the firm being prosecuted. The enforcement authority has no incentive to accept
a payoﬀ that is less than the maximum value  −  , defined as the solution of
(1). We assume that the firm can reduce the enforcement agency’s costs to zero (our
results continue to hold if costs are reduced but remain positive) by accepting the
fine imposed on it. By refusing to negotiate with the firm, the enforcement authority
obtains  − . Thus, we can think of (0 1  )− + as the enforcement
authority’s gain over the status quo of no negotiation from an agreement to settlement
parameters (0 1  ). Similarly, we can think of +−(0 1  )−(0 1) as
the firm’s gain over no negotiation from agreeing to settlement parameters (0 1  ).
We use the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, with a bargaining power equal to
 ∈ (0 1) for the enforcement authority, as our solution concept. (A value of  = 1
2
corresponds to the standard Nash bargaining model.) That is, we assume that the
bargaining outcome is given by the solution of the following problem:
max
0∈[]1∈[]01∈∈[01]
© ln ¡(0 1  )−  − ¢+
(1− ) ln ¡ +  − (0 1  )− (0 1)¢ª  (2)
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At an interior solution, the first order condition with respect to ,  = 0 1, is:

(0 1  )−  + 
(0 1  )
 −
1− 
 +  − (0 1  )− (0 1)
µ(0 1  )
 +
(0 )

¶
= 0 (3)
Since  and  are both strictly decreasing in 0 and strictly increasing in 1, it must
be that at the solution

(0 1  )−  +  
1− 
 +  − (0 1  )− (0 1)  (4)
Diﬀerentiating (2) with respect to  =   gives:
µ 
(0 1  )−  +  −
1− 
 +  − (0 1  )− (0 1)
¶ (0 1  )
  0
where the inequality follows from (4) and the fact that  is strictly increasing in both
 and . It is thus immediate that the solution to (2) is ∗ = max∈  and ∗ = 1 In
addition, the negotiations involve the selection of interior values of 0 and 1, so that
the plea period is reduced below the maximum period.
Claim 2 At an interior solution, the bargaining outcome is for the enforcement au-
thority and the firm to negotiate a settlement that maximizes the culpability score and
scale factor, ∗ = max∈  and ∗ = 1, and reduces the plea period, ∗0  0 =  and
∗1  1 = 
In addition, since −(∗0 ∗1 ∗ ∗) − (∗0 ∗1)  − −  , the firm’s payoﬀ
increases as a result of settlement negotiation and hence deterrence is reduced by the
presence of such settlement negotiation relative to its absence.
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Claim 3 Settlement negotiation that generates restricted pleas reduces deterrence by
increasing the colluding firms’ payoﬀs.
3.3 Example
Consider the following example. Assume the volume of aﬀected commerce is the
same in each period and equal to . Define the base fine as 20% of the amount of
aﬀected commerce, i.e., the base fine is 02(1 − 0). Let  = [0 1] so that the
culpability score is between zero and one. Given the plea period, culpability score,
and scale factor, define the fine to be the following function of the start and end
dates, culpability score, and scale factor:
(0 1  ) = 02(1 − 0)(075 + 125)(1 + )
As we have defined this function, the minimum fine (the fine when  = 0) can be as
little as 75% of the base fine and the maximum fine (the fine when  = 1) can be
as much as four times the base fine, depending on the culpability score. Given the
culpability score, the minimum and maximum fines diﬀer by a factor of 2, with the
final amount of the fine depending on the scale factor.
Define the cost function so that a culpability score or scale factor close to the
upper bound for its range imposes costs on the enforcement agency and/or may lead
to later reductions in the level of the fine. Specifically, we let
( ) = 8
This cost function is chosen so that the cost of choosing  = 1 and  = 1 oﬀsets any
payoﬀ to the enforcement authority from collecting a fine.
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To model the firm’s payoﬀ, assume damages are a factor  times the volume of
aﬀected commerce, so that civil penalties are
(0 1) = 3(1 − 0)
In the absence of negotiations with the firm, the enforcement authority solves
(1). Letting  = 0 and  = 10 then the solution is 0 = 0 1 = 10  = 045
and  = 027, with  = 317,  = 099 and  = 30. In general, as
stated in Claim 1, the plea length will always be chosen at its maximum, but the
culpability score and scale factor will not necessarily be chosen at their maxima.
Without negotiations, the enforcement authority’s payoﬀ is  −  = 218 and
the firm’s payoﬀ is −317 − 30.
When the enforcement authority and the firm negotiate, they set ∗ = 1 and
∗ = 1, and the solution to the first order condition (3) of the bargaining problem
(2) can be easily computed. Letting  = 03, the optimal plea length is 1 − 0 =
716 + 273(1 − ) which is about 27% of its original length if the firm has all the
bargaining power and 49% of its original length with equal bargaining power,  = 05.
Indeed, even if the enforcement authority has all the bargaining power,  = 1, it finds
it advantageous to reduce the plea length to 71% of its original length, as this allows
it to substantially increase the fine paid by the firm.
Recall that the original penalty without negotiation is 317 while with negotia-
tion it is 218 if the firm has all the bargaining power, 396 with equal bargaining
power, and 573 when the enforcement authority has all the bargaining power. When
the firm has all the bargaining power, it is able to reduce the fine in exchange for
eliminating the enforcement authority’s enforcement cost. As the bargaining power
of the enforcement authority increases, the firm is willing to pay a higher fine in order
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to reduce the plea length and hence civil penalties.
4 Leniency for multi-product colluders
We now turn to a diﬀerent set of strategies that colluding firms face after getting
caught, namely strategies related to leniency applications. These strategies diﬀer
from the strategies surrounding settlement negotiation discussed above in that they
suggest actions that colluding firms might take prior to getting caught that can reduce
the probability of detection.
The theoretical economics literature on antitrust leniency has mostly focused on
models of tacit collusion. For surveys, see Rey (2003) and Spagnolo (2008).19 The
general conclusion of these models is that the presence of a leniency program makes
collusion more diﬃcult. The literature has also addressed the potential for the strate-
gic use of leniency by cartels; in particular, it has recognized that by reducing expected
fines, a leniency program may reduce deterrence, e.g., see Chen and Rey (2012), Chen
and Harrington (2007), Spagnolo (2004), and Motta and Polo (2003).
To the extent that the presence of leniency programs makes it harder for firms
to sustain collusion, leniency programs may cause the cartels that do form to invest
in more extensive preparatory work or more sophisticated concealment. This more
sophisticated preparatory work might include reorganizing the corporate hierarchies
of the firms in the cartel in order to limit the number of individuals in the firms
that would need to know about the conspiracy. More sophisticated concealment
might involve hiring an external consulting firm to organize meetings and maintain
19See also Wils (2008, Chapter 5), Chen and Rey (2012), Choi and Gerlach (2012b), Lefouili and
Roux (2012), Harrington (2008), Chen and Harrington (2007), Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic (2006),
Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2005, 2006), Spagnolo (2004), Motta and Polo (2003), and Spagnolo (2000).
Sokol (2012), Zhou (2012), Miller (2009), and Stephan (2009) contain empirical investigations of
leniency; for experimental analyses see Bigoni et al. (2012a,b) and Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008).
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sensitive cartel documents in a location out of reach of authorities.20
In some cases, however, leniency can potentially provide incentives for firms that
are colluding in one product to extend the conspiracy to include another product.
Given the ability of cartels to adapt in response to changing enforcement regimes,
the possible existence of this or other “perverse eﬀects” from leniency programs is a
concern that has been raised in the literature. As stated in Wils (2008a):
[S]uccessful cartels tend to be sophisticated organisations, capable of learn-
ing. It is thus safe to assume that cartel participants will try to adapt their
organisation to leniency policies, not only so as to minimise the destabilis-
ing eﬀect, but also, where possible, to exploit leniency policies to facilitate
the creation and maintenance of cartels. This raises the question whether
there could be features of leniency programmes that risk being exploited
to perverse eﬀects. Wils (2008a, p.137)
There are many examples of firms engaged in collusion in more than one product,
and even many examples of firms applying for leniency in more than one product.
Table 1 from Marshall, Marx, and Mezzetti (2013) considers EC decisions in cartel
cases for 2001—2012 and shows that 21 multi-product colluders have received a 100%
fine reduction through the leniency program in at least one of the products in which
they were prosecuted.21
20For example, the Organic Peroxides Cartel hired a consulting firm, AC Treuhand, that main-
tained certain cartel documents in Switzerland: “[AC Treuhand] produced, distributed and recol-
lected the so called ‘pink’ and ‘red’ papers with the agreed market shares which were, because of
their colour, easily distinguishable from other meeting documents and were not allowed to be taken
outside the AC Treuhand premises.” (EC Decision in Organic Peroxides at para. 92(b))
21Some EC decisions apply to more than one product. For example, the EC decision in Vitamins
covers multiple vitamin products, with a separate application of the leniency program for each
product.
18
Table 1: Multi-product colluders that received a complete fine reduction
in at least one product in EC cartel cases 2001—2012
Firm
Number of      
products
No fine 
reduction
Incomplete fine 
reduction
Complete fine 
reduction
Akzo Nobel 9 2 4 3
Takeda 6 4 1 1
Aventis 5 2 3
William Prym 5 1 3 1
Bayer 4 2 2
KONE 4 1 1 2
Otis 4 3 1
Degussa 3 1 2
Merck 3 1 1 1
Samsung 3 1 2
Shell 3 2 1
ABB Ltd 2 1 1
Boliden 2 1 1
BP 2 2
Chemtura 2 2
Chiquita 2 2
DHL and Exel 2 2
GrafTech International 2 2
Kemira Oyj 2 1 1
Mueller 2 2
Siemens 2 1 1
Table 1 reflects a concern that has been raised regarding leniency that it is often
the large firms that are the ones applying for leniency, again raising the concern that
leniency programs are being exploited.
We review two papers, Choi and Gerlach (2012a) andMarshall, Marx, andMezzetti
(2013) that address the potential exploitation of leniency by multi-product colluders.
In the model of Choi and Gerlach (2012a), firms operate in a repeated oligopoly in
each of two product markets.22 For certain parameter values, when the firms engage
in collusion in only one product, collusive equilibria may not exist or it may be that
the only collusive equilibrium involves both firms applying for leniency whenever the
antitrust authority opens an investigation. For such parameter values, a leniency
program is eﬀective at deterring collusion or at increasing the probability that a
single-product cartel that comes under investigation will be successfully prosecuted
and penalized.
22See Choi and Gerlach (2012b) on the eﬀects on multi-product cartels of demand linkages among
products.
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However, if firms engage in collusion in multiple products, additional equilibria
exist in which a leniency program is less eﬀective. As shown in Choi and Gerlach
(2012a, Propositions 2 and 5), equilibria exist in which multi-product firms do not
apply for leniency at all if there is an investigation in only one of the products aﬀected
by the conspiracy, and they only apply for leniency in one product when both products
come under investigation. This type of collusive strategy increases the expected per-
product profit for the multi-product cartel. For some parameter values, collusive
equilibria exist only when firms collude in multiple products and not otherwise. Thus,
leniency can provide an incentive for firms to extend collusive conduct to a larger
number of products.
Some antitrust leniency programs explicitly link fine reductions across products for
multi-product cartels. For example, in the United States, under the DOJ’s Amnesty
Plus program, a firm that is being prosecuted for collusion in one product but that
is not the leniency applicant can still potentially receive treatment as if it were the
leniency applicant by applying for leniency and thereby turning in another product.
According to the DOJ:
The size of the Amnesty Plus discount depends on a number of factors,
including: (1) the strength of the evidence provided by the cooperating
company in the leniency product; (2) the potential significance of the vio-
lation reported in the leniency application, measured in such terms as the
volume of commerce involved, the geographic scope, and the number of co-
conspirator companies and individuals; and (3) the likelihood the Division
would have uncovered the additional violation absent the self-reporting,
i.e., if there were little or no overlap in the corporate participants and/or
the culpable executives involved in the original cartel under investigation
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and the Amnesty Plus matter, then the credit for the disclosure would be
greater. Of these three factors, the first two are given the most weight.23
Marshall, Marx, and Mezzetti (2013) provide a model of the eﬀects on multi-
product colluders of diﬀerent implementations of an antitrust leniency program by
a competition authority. First, they show that an antitrust leniency program that
requires convicted firms to attest to whether or not they are colluding in any other
product markets can increase leniency applications in the first product investigated
but reduce the probability of prosecution in the other products. This linkage can
create incentives for firms to extend collusion to sacrificial products or markets. By
applying for leniency in products where penalties would be limited, firms may be able
to reduce the probability of conviction in more valuable products.
Marshall, Marx, and Mezzetti (2013) also study the Amnesty Plus program. They
model Amnesty Plus by assuming that each of two firms colluding on a main product
has the option to collude with some other firm in a separate, minor, product with lim-
ited antitrust liability. In this environment, Amnesty Plus can create both additional
incentives for collusion in the main product and incentives for firms to collude in
other products. To see why, note that collusion in the minor product gives each firm
the ability to obtain reduced fines in the main product should the firm be prosecuted,
even if it is not the leniency applicant. In turn, this reduces the incentives for firms
to apply for leniency in the main product, which reduces detection and deterrence.
As noted in Marshall, Marx, and Mezzetti (2013, p.30):
The negative eﬀect of Amnesty Plus on detection and deterrence occurs
because Amnesty Plus reduces the preemption eﬀect. A firm has less
23The U.S. DoJ’s “Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Antitrust Divi-
sion’s Leniency Program and Model Leniency Letters” (2008, p.9) (available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/239583.htm, accessed October 23, 2012).
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incentive to apply for leniency if it can obtain a similar fine reduction
through Amnesty Plus in the event that its co-conspirator applies for
leniency. A similar reduction in the preemption eﬀect occurs when the
competition authority oﬀers fine discounts for cooperating firms other
than the first firm to apply for leniency.
In this way, leniency programs that link fine reductions across markets or prod-
ucts can create opportunities for strategic reactions that ultimately result in reduced
detection and deterrence. In particular, Amnesty Plus, as well as other cooperation
discounts, reduce concerns by colluding firms that they will lose the race to be first
to apply for leniency, because these programs allow them to obtain discounts even if
they are not first. When conspirators do not have a strong incentive to be first to
apply for leniency, it may be that in equilibrium no firm applies at all. In this way,
Amnesty Plus and cooperation discounts more generally reduce the incentive of firms
to apply for leniency, dampening the eﬀectiveness of a leniency program.
5 Conclusion
There appears to be some flexibility for cartels to negotiate settlement terms that
favor them in terms of limiting expected future penalties, for example from civil
litigation, in exchange for concessions to competition authority, which may include
the amount of criminal fines, the number of individuals receiving prison terms, or the
total length of prison terms.
Our model suggests that limited criminal pleas, for example in terms of plea
length, customers aﬀected, or geography, can handicap the ability of civil litigants to
pursue damages and hence reduce deterrence. From an empirical research viewpoint,
pleas must be viewed as identifying only a subset of the conspiratorial conduct, not
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as a description of the full extent and exact nature of the conspiracy.
Furthermore, there are ways in which leniency policies can potentially create in-
centives for colluding firms to engage in collusion in additional products. As shown
in Choi and Gerlach (2012a), firms colluding in multiple products may be able to
coordinate their strategies across products, thereby insulating one of the products
from the threat of leniency applications. Marshall, Marx, and Mezzetti (2013) show
that the Amnesty Plus program, which provides fine reductions to colluding firms
that reveal collusion in other products, also provides incentives for firms to engage
in collusion in additional products. Extending collusion to other products provides
the benefit of reducing the threat of leniency applications in the original product;
colluding firms know they can obtain fine reductions through Amnesty Plus even if
they are not the first to apply for leniency.
The results and discussion of this paper suggest that antitrust enforcement au-
thorities should ensure that incentives for settlement negotiations recognize that de-
terrence relies on civil as well as criminal penalties and that antitrust enforcement
authorities should consider the possibility of strategic abuse of leniency programs, es-
pecially the possibilities that arise when collusion in one product aﬀects incentives for
leniency applications in another product. The analysis presented here suggests value
in additional case studies of cartel conduct, including internal studies conducted by
enforcement agencies such as the DOJ. In addition, this analysis points to the need
for enforcement agencies to continue to adjust and enhance the tools available to
them, including potentially such changes as encouraging whistleblowers for collusive
conduct (see Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic, 2006) or expanding the opportunities and
benefits for individual leniency applicants.
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